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Supreme Court and Securities Class Actions
The Supreme Court’s Impact on Securities Class Actions:
An Empirical Assessment of Tellabs
The Supreme Court is not all that interested in securities law; on average, it hears about
one securities case per year. 1 The Court’s inattention means that many areas of securities
regulation are left to be developed by the lower courts and the SEC. In the field of securities
class actions, that means mainly development by the district and appellate courts, with
occasional amicus participation from the SEC. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has
taken a more active role in the area, loading up its still small securities docket with securities
class actions. The impetus for this attention no doubt arises from the enactment of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), which gave rise to a host of interpretive
questions.
In this paper, we assess the impact of the Supreme Court’s recent securities decisions on
the lower courts, where most of the action in securities fraud class actions occurs. In particular,
we are interested in the effect of Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 2 on lower court
decisions. Tellabs interprets the PSLRA’s “strong inference” standard for pleading scienter—the
defendants’ state of mind—in Rule 10b‐5 cases; 3 the Supreme Court reversed a very lenient
Seventh Circuit decision for drawing inferences with respect to scienter, but replaced it with a
standard that is nonetheless relatively generous to plaintiffs.
Tellabs represents one of the Supreme Court’s first opportunities to interpret the

1

A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and the Counter‐Revolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 Duke L.J.
841 (2003).
2
551 U.S. 308 (2007).
3
Exchange Act § 21D(b)(2).
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PSLRA. 4 More importantly, Tellabs addressed a question central to motion to dismiss practice
in the lower courts. The PSLRA makes the motion to dismiss the main event in securities fraud
class actions, effectively making district courts gatekeepers charged with screening out
meritless class actions at an early stage. The evidence on how effective district courts are at
doing this task is mixed, 5 but there can be little doubt that Tellabs will influence lower court
judges as they undertake this sorting process. The strong inference scienter provision
interpreted in Tellabs is central to Congress’s efforts to screen out meritless class actions in
enacting the PSLRA, and appellate courts have split in determining the height of the barrier it
has created for plaintiffs pleading fraud. 6 Thus, Tellabs has the potential to affect significantly
motion to dismiss outcomes.
To assess this possibility, we collect a sample of securities class action complaints filed
from 2003 until the date of the Tellabs decision in 2007, along with the decisions resolving
motions to dismiss in those cases. We limit our sample to suits filed just prior to the Tellabs
decision to avoid possible selection effects from Tellabs on suits filed after the decision,
allowing us to observe directly the impact of Tellabs on motion to dismiss decisions. Although
4

An earlier case, Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005), addresses the question of the
plaintiffs’ burden – for both pleading and proof – with respect to loss causation in Rule 10b‐5 cases, that is, the
required connection between the defendant’s misrepresentation and the plaintiffs’ losses. We touch upon Dura
briefly below.
The Supreme Court interpreted the PSLRA again recently in Stoneridge Investment Partners LLC v.
Scientific‐Atlanta, Inc., 128 S.Ct. 761 (2008). This decision is likely to have significant implications for secondary
defendants, but it was handed down after our sample period, so we leave it for future work.
5
Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act? 23 J. of Law,
Economics & Organization 598 (2007); Stephen J. Choi, Stephen J., Karen K. Nelson & A.C. Pritchard, The Screening
Effect of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 6 J. Empirical Leg. Stud. 35 (2009); Marilyn F. Johnson, Karen
K. Nelson & A. C. Pritchard, Do the Merits Matter More? The Impact of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act,
23 J. of Law, Economics & Organization 627 (2007).
6
See Joseph A. Grundfest and A.C. Pritchard, Statutes with Multiple Personality Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity
in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 627 (2002) (describing Congress’s tacit “agreement to
disagree” over the PSLRA’s pleading standard and the ensuing split in the circuits over the interpretation of that
standard).
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we collect data from all circuits, we highlight in our analysis the Ninth Circuit, traditionally the
leading venues for securities fraud class actions. The Ninth Circuit also has the most stringent
standard for pleading scienter. We find that Tellabs correlates with a significantly lower
dismissal rate in the Ninth Circuit. A lower rate of dismissals may improve on shareholder
welfare if the suits that are not dismissed consist primarily of meritorious suits. However, we
also find that suits that settled in the post‐Tellabs period correspond with a higher incidence of
nuisance settlements—suggesting that Tellabs undermined the anti‐frivolous litigation
objective of the PSLRA. We conclude that Tellabs was a significant victory for the plaintiffs’ bar.
We proceed as follows. Part 1 describes the Tellabs decision and develops hypotheses
relating to the effect of those decisions in the different circuits. Part 2 describes the sample
and provides descriptive statistics. Part 3 presents the results of our empirical tests of our
hypotheses. Part 4 concludes.

1.

Background and Hypotheses
Tellabs addressed the key provision in the PSLRA for weeding out frivolous “stock price

drop” lawsuits: the strong inference standard for scienter. That provision requires plaintiffs to
“state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the
required state of mind.” 7 The provision was modeled after the standard applied in the Second
Circuit prior to the PSLRA, which was generally regarded as the most stringent at the time. 8 In

7
8

Exchange Act § 21D(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. 78u‐4(b)(2).
See S. Rep. No. 104‐98, at 15 (1993), reprinted in 1995‐96 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
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adopting the strong inference provision, Congress specifically rejected the looser standard
applied in the Ninth Circuit. 9
Prior to the PSLRA, the Second Circuit had held that plaintiffs could meet the scienter
standard in one of two ways. First, plaintiffs could plead that the defendants had the motive to
commit fraud and the opportunity to do so. 10 Although simplistic allegations of motive that
could apply generally, such as keeping one’s job, 11 were insufficient to meet the standard,
other allegations of specific financial gain from a transaction were sufficient to state a claim. 12
Second, plaintiffs could meet the standard with circumstantial evidence of either recklessness
or conscious behavior. 13 Generally, this standard required plaintiffs to plead contemporaneous
facts, conditions, or statements to show that the defendants knew or should have known that
the alleged misstatement was misleading when made. 14
After the PSLRA was enacted, the Second Circuit relied on the legislative history and
held that the PSLRA codified its pre‐PSLRA pleading approach. 15 By contrast, the Ninth Circuit

9

Consistent with the language of Rule 9(b), before the PSLRA, the Ninth Circuit had developed a heightened
pleading standard allowing plaintiffs to plead scienter generally, but demanding particularity in alleging all other
elements of securities fraud. See In re Glenfed Sec. Litig., 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994).
10
Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
11
See In re Crystal Brands Sec. Litig., 862 F. Supp. 745, 749 (D. Conn. 1994).
12
See Goldman v. Belden, 754 F.2d 1059, 1070 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that allegations that defendants bullish
statements to market were connected to significant stock sales met motive and opportunity test).
13
See San Leandro Emergency Med. Group Profit Sharing Plan v. Philip Morris Co., 75 F.3d 801 (2d Cir. 1996)
(requiring plaintiffs seeking to meet recklessness standard to provide higher level of detail than that required
under motive and opportunity test).
14
See Shields v. Citytrust Bancorp, 25 F.3d 1124, 1129 (2d. Cir. 1994) (rejecting allegations of fraud where plaintiffs
failed to contrast public disclosure with contemporaneous internal document or data).
15
Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 311 (2000). The Second Circuit has, however, refined its explication of the
standard post‐PSLRA. Now, rather than a two‐prong test, the Second Circuit has set forth a list of the general types
of allegations that will meet the heightened pleading standard for scienter. Synthesizing its own case law on the
pleading standard, the Second Circuit held that plaintiffs can plead a strong inference of fraudulent intent by
including sufficient allegations that the defendants: received concrete, personal benefits from the alleged fraud;
participated in deliberately illegal behavior; knew or had access to facts “suggesting” that the public statements
were inaccurate; or “failed to check information they had a duty to monitor.” See id. at 311. This refined
standard, of course, still leaves room for pleading based on motive and opportunity.

5
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recognized that the PSLRA repudiated that court’s old standard, which did not require that
state of mind be pleaded with specificity. In interpreting the “strong inference” provision, the
Ninth Circuit also relied on the PSLRA’s legislative history, but concluded that the statute raised
the standard above that of the Second Circuit. 16 Under this higher pleading standard, the Ninth
Circuit rejected allegations based on motive and opportunity and on recklessness. Instead, to
meet the Ninth Circuit’s new pleading standard for scienter, plaintiffs had to plead, “at a
minimum, particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate or conscious
recklessness.” 17

Most circuits, however, took a middle course in interpreting the strong

inference standard, concluding that motive and opportunity allegations might suffice to support
a strong inference of scienter, but courts would need to evaluate such allegations on a “case‐
by‐case” basis. 18
The choice of scienter standard has important consequences: the Ninth Circuit, in
adopting the most stringent standard post‐PSLRA, also substantially increased its dismissal rate.
In an earlier study, Pritchard and Sale found that Ninth Circuit courts dismissed cases at a 63%
rate, while Second Circuit courts dismissed only 36%. 19
When the Supreme Court finally entered the fray over the interpretation of the strong
inference standard in Tellabs, however, it did not resolve this longstanding split among the

16

See In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id.
18
Greebel v. FTP Software, Inc., 194 F.3d 185 (1st Cir. 1999); Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc. 353 F.3d
338 (4th Cir. 2003); Nathenson v. Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001); In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183
F.3d 542 (6th Cir. 1999); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588 (7th Cir. 2006); Fla. State Bd. of
Admin v. GreenTree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001); In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d 970 (9th Cir. 1999); City
of Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2001); Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271 (11th
Cir. 1999).
19
A.C. Pritchard and Hillary A. Sale, What Counts as Fraud? An Empirical Study of Motions to Dismiss Under the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 2 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 125 (2005).
17
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circuits over the stringency of the standard. Instead, it addressed a collateral, but related,
issue: In considering whether the facts alleged by the plaintiff gave rise to strong inference of
scienter, should a court consider competing inferences arising from those facts? The occasion
for considering the question arose from the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc. holding that a complaint should survive “if it alleges facts from which, if true,
a reasonable person could infer that the defendant acted with the required intent”
(Reasonableness). 20 In so holding, the Seventh Circuit specifically rejected the position of the
Sixth Circuit, which had held that “plaintiffs are entitled only to the most plausible of competing
inferences” (Preponderance). 21
The Supreme Court in Tellabs split the difference, steering a middle course between the
Seventh Circuit’s position and the position urged by the defendants and the government, which
both endorsed the Sixth Circuit’s requirement that the plaintiff’s complaint establish scienter by
a preponderance. 22 As the government’s brief pointed out, the Seventh Circuit’s standard
would have made Congress’s effort in enacting the scienter standard toothless, as it would
mean reverting to pre‐PSLRA standards under Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 23 Justice Ginsberg, writing for the majority in Tellabs, rejected that reasonableness
standard, instead requiring a comparative inquiry: “A complaint will survive, we hold, only if a
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as
20

437 F.3d 588, (7th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 601‐602 (quoting Fidel v. Farley, 392 F.3d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 2004)).
22
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,
No. 06‐484, 2007 WL 460606, at *26 (arguing that “if the alleged facts give rise to two seemingly equally strong
competing inferences, a court must conclude that the inference of scienter is not itself strong.”) (citations and
quotation marks omitted).
23
Id. at *23 (arguing that “the court of appeals’ standard appears to be equivalent to the standard that it (and
some other courts of appeals) had applied before the enactment of the Reform Act, under which a complaint was
sufficient if the plaintiff pleaded facts that supported at least a reasonable inference of state of mind.”).
21
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any opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.” 24 Ties go to the plaintiff, but
the plaintiff, as the master of the complaint, must show that the inference of fraudulent intent
is at least as likely as an innocent one (Equal Inference). Justices Scalia and Alito would have
gone further, requiring plaintiffs to show fraudulent intent by a preponderance of the
evidence. 25

Justice Stevens urged the adoption of a more generous “probable cause”

standard. 26
The Seventh Circuit’s Tellabs decision was an outlier.

Most circuit courts had

anticipated the Supreme Court’s ruling that the inference must be at least equally plausible to
be a “strong inference,” 27 although several had adopted the preponderance standard urged by
the government and adopted by Scalia and Alito in their concurrences. 28 Only the Third Circuit
had adopted the “reasonable” standard of the Seventh Circuit. 29 Consequently, the Supreme
Court’s decision in Tellabs, while repudiating the lenient standard adopted in the Seventh
Circuit, arguably had a more significant effect in the circuits that had adopted the
“preponderance” standard: the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits.

We posit three

hypotheses on the effect of Tellabs on the Circuits.
H1A: Ninth Circuit and other courts previously applying the preponderance standard will be
less likely to dismiss complaints based on scienter grounds post‐Tellabs.
H1B: Courts applying the equality standard should be no more likely to dismiss complaints
based on scienter grounds post‐Tellabs.
24

Tellabs, 127 S.Ct. at 2510.
Id. at 2513 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2515 (Alito, J., concurring).
26
Id. at 2516 (Steven, J., dissenting).
27
Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47 (2d Cir. 1995); Rosenzweig v. Azurix Corp., 332 F.3d 854 (5th Cir. 2003);
Fla. State Bd. Of Admin v. Gree Tree Fin. Corp., 270 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2001); Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182
(10th Cir. 2003); Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2006).
28
In re Credit Suiss First Boston Corp., 431 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2005); Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc., 353
F.3d 338 (4th Cir. 2003); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540 (6th Cir. 2001); Gompper v. VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893
(9th Cir. 2002).
29
In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Sec. Litig., 438 F.3d 256 (3rd Cir. 2006).
25
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H1C: Courts previously applying the reasonableness standard should be more likely to dismiss
complaints based on scienter grounds post‐Tellabs.
We are also interested in the consequences for defendants stemming from the
relatively generous Tellabs equality standard. We predict that defendants will be less likely to
get an early dismissal of weak complaints with prejudice. To state it differently, district courts
applying the equality standard will be more likely to give plaintiffs an opportunity to amend
defective complaints before final dismissal.
H2A: Ninth Circuit and other courts previously applying the preponderance standard will take
longer to dismiss complaints with prejudice post‐Tellabs.
H2B: Courts applying the equality standard should take no more decisions to dismiss
complaints with prejudice post‐Tellabs.
H2C: Courts previously applying the reasonableness standard should dismiss complaints with
prejudice sooner post‐Tellabs.
We now turn to the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision on monetary outcomes. The
next proposition follows directly from the last two: if defendants find it more difficult to obtain
a dismissal with prejudice, or if it takes longer to obtain that dismissal, they will be more willing
to settle even weak cases in order to avoid the costs of litigation.
H3A: Defendants in Ninth Circuit and other courts previously applying the preponderance
standard will be more likely to pay nuisance settlements post‐Tellabs.
H3B: Defendants in courts applying the equality standard should be no more likely to pay
nuisance settlements post‐Tellabs.
H3C: Defendants in courts previously applying the reasonableness standard should be more
likely to pay nuisance settlements post‐Tellabs.

2.

Sample and Descriptive Statistics
2.1

Sample

To test our hypotheses, we construct our sample by collecting complaints from
securities class actions filed from 2003 to mid‐2007 (right before the Tellabs decision on June
9
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21, 2007) from the Stanford Securities Clearinghouse. Thus, all of the cases in our sample were
filed pre‐Tellabs, but many of the decisions resolving motions to dismiss those cases were
handed down after Tellabs. The strength of our data set is that this time period minimizes any
selection effects that follow from the Tellabs decision. We are able to observe directly the
impact of Tellabs on the motion to dismiss decision without having to take into account any
shift in the mix of cases appearing before the court. It, however, precludes us in this study from
testing how plaintiffs’ attorneys responded to Tellabs in their decision to file suit.
We limit our sample to cases in which an allegation of fraud was made under Rule 10b‐5
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, although we include public offering cases (§ 11 of the
Securities Act) and proxy cases (§ 14 of the Exchange Act) if a Rule 10b‐5 claim is made as well.
We exclude cases in which financial firms (SIC 6000 to 6999) are the primary defendant because
of the different regulatory regime that applies to them.
[Insert Table 1 About Here].
Table 1 shows that the lawsuit filings were distributed relatively equally across our
sample period, although there is some tapering off in 2006. Looking at the frequency of lawsuit
by circuit, we find that the Second and Ninth Circuits are clearly head‐and‐shoulders above
their peers with 18% and 27% of the lawsuits. Thus, nearly half of the cases in our sample come
from these two circuits, which sit on opposite ends of the scale for pleading scienter.
Looking at suit outcomes, we see that settlement is the most common outcome (47% of
the cases), but dismissal with prejudice is not far behind (40%). If dismissal with prejudice is
combined with voluntary dismissal, over half of the cases end up being dismissed in some
manner. This finding suggests that plaintiffs’ lawyers are taking on substantial risk in these
10
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art107

10

Pritchard and Choi:

Supreme Court and Securities Class Actions
cases, although that risk may not be evenly distributed across all cases. Notably, only a trivial
percentage of cases are resolved through summary judgment or trial. These findings confirm
that the motion to dismiss is the main event for most defendants; if they fail to prevail at this
point, settlement is likely. Comparing the Ninth Circuit with the other circuits, we see that
settlement is slightly less likely in the Ninth Circuit.

2.2

Control Variables
Descriptive statistics regarding the cases are presented in Table 2. We use the following

set of variables in each of our multivariate models as controls (collectively referred as “Case
Controls”). From the complaints, we collect information about the causes of action alleged and
use indicator variables for the cause of action. 30 All of our cases were selected to include a Rule
10b‐5 cause of action (the base category). Eleven percent of the cases also allege a § 11 claim
under the Securities Act of 1933 (Section 11).

Section 11 is only available for material

misstatements and certain omissions in the registration statement used in a public offering, but
it allows for substantial easier because it does not require plaintiffs to plead fraudulent intent.
Moreover, loss causation and due diligence are affirmative defenses. Claims under § 14 of the
Exchange Act relating to misstatements in a proxy statement also carry an easier standard for
state of mind and loss causation (Section 14), but these are found in a much smaller percentage
of the sample. Most suits allege solely Rule 10b‐5 violations.
[Insert Table 2 About Here].
30

For each class action, we collected data from the last filed consolidated class complaint. When a consolidated
complaint was not available, we collected data from the last filed complaint on file with the Stanford Securities
Class Clearinghouse.

11
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Complaints will typically provide detail on the revelation for the fraud that triggered the
lawsuit. We include in our Case Controls indicator variables for government investigations
(Govt. Investigation) and financial restatements (Restatement), each a high profile adverse
event, are the most common events giving rise to these suits. The presence of a government
investigation or a financial restatement indicates a higher likelihood of wrongdoing and thus a
stronger case for the plaintiffs. The overall strength of the case will also be bolstered if the firm
has terminated a top officer (Officer Term.) or its auditor (Auditor Term.) due to events relating
to the fraud in question.
We also include variables in our Case Controls relating to the firm‐specific characteristics
of the defendant issuer. We include a measure of firm size, measured as market value of equity
measured at the end of the fiscal year preceding the beginning of the class period (Market
Capitalization). Larger firms may have greater resources to defend against a class action. On
the other hand, larger firms may also a greater ability to pay a settlement, leading to more
vigorous prosecution of case by plaintiffs’ attorneys. We also include two industry controls that
may relate to case strength and loss causation. Firms in the high technology sector (High Tech)
may have stock prices that are particularly vulnerable to declines in sales or earnings. Firms in
pharmaceuticals and medical devices (FDA) may experience steep stock price declines if the
Food and Drug Administration deny approval of their new products.
We also collect data for our Case Controls relating to the use of confidential witnesses in
the complaints in our sample (Confidential). This data is collected from the first complaint after
the selection of the lead plaintiff. Since the cases were all selected prior to the Tellabs decision,
we are unable to test the impact of Tellabs on confidential witness use. Nonetheless, this data
12
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may offer insights on the quality of the complaints filed in the different circuits. We see that
complaints filed in the Ninth Circuit are somewhat less likely to rely on confidential witnesses,
but the difference is not significant at conventional levels (p‐value=0.134).
For our tests focusing on dismissals based on a lack of scienter, we include a set of
variables relating to the allegation of defendant motive in the complaint (referred to as the
“Motive Variables”). We collect allegations from the complaint relating to motive for the fraud
and the triggering event for its revelation.

Motive allegations are typically intended to help

satisfy the scienter requirement. Insider trading is by far the most common motivation alleged
(Insider Trading).

Other motive allegations that may lead an issuer to overinflate their

financials or overvalue their shares refer to executive bonus compensation (Bonus) and the
intention of the issuer to offer securities (Offering), to use their stock as consideration for
acquisitions (Acquisition), or to merge with another company in a stock merger (Merger).
Lastly, we track variables relating to the lead plaintiffs and their attorneys. This data 31
only tracks lead plaintiffs and their selected lead counsel. As a result, the data exists only for
securities class actions where the litigation reached the lead plaintiff and lead counsel stage.
Because we lack data on the lead plaintiff and selected lead counsel for all our cases, we use
these variables only for robustness tests. We include an indicator variable for the presence of
only institutions as lead plaintiff (All Institutional Lead Plaintiff). Institutional lead plaintiffs may
have greater ability in monitoring plaintiffs’ attorneys and bring only stronger cases. We also
include an indicator variable for the most experienced securities class action firms that act as

31

These data are obtained from Stephen J. Choi, Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Actions, Working
Paper, NYU (2009).

13
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lead counsel (Top Attorney). 32 Attorneys more experienced in class actions may have different
selection criteria for the cases that they bring or may have greater resources to bring to bear in
investigating fraud and drafting complaints.

These differences may affect probability of

dismissal.
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics relating to the rationale for dismissing the
complaint. Scienter, the issue addressed by Tellabs, is far and away the most commonly
invoked argument for dismissing complaints, with 40% of dismissals relying at least in part on
the failure to adequately allege scienter. The same argument is rejected in nearly a quarter of
dismissal decisions.
[Insert Table 3 About Here].

3.

Empirical Testing

3.1

Suit Outcome and Tellabs
We begin by assessing the effect of Tellabs on case outcomes, specifically, the likelihood

of dismissal. As noted above, scienter is by far the most frequently litigated issue in motions to
dismiss, appearing in over 60% of motion to dismiss decisions, so Tellabs certainly has the
potential to influence outcomes. On the other hand, the Reasonableness standard adopted by
the Seventh Circuit was an outlier, with most circuits adhering to either the Equal Inference
standard adopted the Supreme Court in Tellabs or the Preponderance standard espoused by
Justices Scalia and Alito in their concurrences. And as Justice Scalia noted in his concurrence,
the difference between the equal inference and preponderance standards is likely to be
32

See Stephen J. Choi, Motions for Lead Plaintiff in Securities Class Actions, Working Paper, New York University
(2009).

14
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determinative in only a small fraction of cases. 33 Given the limited change to the law effected
by Tellabs in most circuits, would it make any difference to outcomes?
We begin to assess that question by looking at dismissals. We estimate a logit model
using as our dependent variable Terminate, a binary division between defendant wins –
summary judgment, dismissal with prejudice, or voluntary dismissal – and plaintiff victories –
settlement or trial verdict. We construct variables capturing both the standard for drawing
inferences used in the circuits prior to Tellabs. Our base category for drawing inferences is the
Equal Inference standard ultimately adopted by the Supreme Court, so we include indicator
variables for the Reasonableness standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Tellabs (also used
in the Third Circuit), and Preponderance is the standard advocated by Justices Scalia and Alito
(adopted in the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Ninth Circuits). We use these variables, along with the
Post‐Tellabs variable and interaction variables for each. We also include the Case Control
variables.

Terminatei = α + ß1iPost‐Tellabsi + ß2iReasonablenessi
+ ß3iReasonableness * Post‐Tellabsi + ß4iPreponderancei
+ ß5i Preponderance * Post‐Tellabsi + ∑ßkiCase Controlski + εi

Table 4 reports the results as Model 1. In order to assess the impact of Tellabs on the Ninth
Circuit, we run one model with just cases from that circuit, eliminating the Reasonableness and
Preponderance circuit related variables (Model 2). In our last model, we estimate the model
for the entire sample replacing the Reasonableness and Preponderance circuit related variables
33

Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2514 (“I doubt that in this instance what I deem to be the correct test will produce results
much different from the Court's. How often is it that inferences are precisely in equipoise?”).

15
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with an indicator variable for the Ninth Circuit and an interaction term for Ninth Circuit x Post‐
Tellabs (Model 3).
The results in Table 4 confirm that Tellabs made dismissal significantly less likely, with
our key variable of interest, Post‐Tellabs, negative and significant in all three models. The
indicator variables for Reasonableness and Preponderance are insignificant, however, as are
the interaction variables in Model 1. The coefficients on Ninth Circuit and Ninth Circuit x Post‐
Tellabs are also not significant in Model 3. Thus, Tellabs appears to have had an impact on
overall dismissals, but it cannot be isolated based on the law in those circuits prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision. 34
Most of the Case Controls in Table 4 are not significantly different from zero. The
coefficient on Restatement is negative and significant in all three models, indicating that a
restatement makes it less likely that a case will terminate. Larger firms, as measured by market
capitalization, on the other hand, seem to be more successful in obtaining a termination of
litigation. The coefficient on ln(market capitalization) is positive and significant at the 1% level
in Models 1 and 3.
[Table 4 about here]
3.3

Scienter as Grounds for Dismissal and Tellabs

The regression results presented in Table 4 focused on the overall effect of Tellabs on
case outcomes. We now focus on final dismissal decisions based on scienter. In place of the
Terminate dependent variable used in the last set of regressions, we instead use an ordered
34

As a robustness test, we added the Top Attorney and All Institutional Lead Plaintiff variables to assess the
importance of attorney and lead plaintiff expertise (and selection) to the three models in Table 4. Unreported,
neither variable is significant in the models. Moreover, the robustness models generate the same qualitative
results as in Table 4.
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logit model, with the dependent variable “Scienter.” Scienter is defined to equal 1 if the final
motion to dismiss decision ordered dismissal (at least partially) based on a failure to plead
scienter with particularity, 0 if the decision both denied and granted dismissal based on
scienter, and ‐1 if the decision denied dismissal based on scienter. We estimate the same
three models in Table 4, including the same Case Controls. To each model, we add the Motive
Variables for the scienter alleged in the complaint (Insider Trading, Bonus, Offering, Acquisition,
and Merger).
Scienteri = α + ß1iPost‐Tellabsi + ß2iReasonablenessi
+ ß3iReasonableness * Post‐Tellabsi + ß4iPreponderancei
+ ß5i Preponderance * Post‐Tellabsi + ∑ßkiCase Controlski
+ ∑ßliMotive Variablesli + εi

We present the results in Table 5. These results show that impact of Tellabs is primarily
in the circuits that had previously applied the Preponderance standard. Those circuits were
significantly more likely to dismiss prior to Tellabs, with a positive coefficient on the
Preponderance variable that is significant at the 5% level in Model 1. The interaction variable is
negative and significant at the 10% level (and the sum of Post‐Tellabs and Post‐Tellabs x
Preponderance is negative and significant at the 1% level), suggesting that those circuits
became less likely to dismiss after Tellabs. This evidence would seem to contradict Justice
Scalia’s suggestion in his dissent that the difference between the Equal Inference standard and
Preponderance standard was unlikely to come into play in most cases.

None of the Motive

Variables were significant in the models.
[Table 5 About Here]
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As expected, we find that the Ninth Circuit is more likely to dismiss based on scienter
grounds than other circuits. Tellabs, however, seems to have diminished the Ninth Circuit’s
propensity to dismiss. Post‐Tellabs is negative and significant at the 5% level in the regression
for the Ninth Circuit sub‐sample (Model 2), and the interaction variable for the Ninth Circuit
and Post‐Tellabs is significant in the overall sample (Model 3). Thus, Tellabs appears to have
had its most substantial effect reducing the propensity of circuits to dismiss on scienter grounds
in circuits previously applying the Preponderance standard, and in particular, the Ninth
Circuit. 35
3.4

Litigation Delay and Tellabs
We now turn to the cost of Tellabs for defendants seeking dismissal. As our proxy for

those costs, we assess the effect of Tellabs on the time required for defendants to obtain a
dismissal with prejudice.
One important question for litigants is how many “bites at the apple” will be afforded to
the plaintiffs. Defendants are anxious to obtain a dismissal with prejudice at the earliest
moment to minimize the expense and distraction of the lawsuit. Plaintiffs, however, want to
avail themselves of the opportunity to craft a complaint that will pass muster with the district
court; earlier opinions dismissing a complaint without prejudice may provide guidance to the

35

As a robustness test, we added the Top Attorney and All Institutional Lead Plaintiff variables to assess the
importance of attorney and lead plaintiff expertise (and selection) to the three models in Table 5. Unreported,
neither variable is significant in the models. Moreover, the results of the robustness models differ somewhat from
those in Table 5. While the coefficient on Preponderance is still positive, it is now significant at the 1% level. In
contrast, the coefficient on the interaction term Post‐Tellabs x Preponderance is not significantly different from
zero. Similarly, the coefficient on Post‐Tellabs for the Ninth Circuit‐only subset is not significantly different from
zero. Lastly, while the coefficient on Ninth Circuit in the model with all the circuits is still positive and significant at
the 1% level, the coefficient on Ninth Circuit x Post‐Tellabs is not significantly different from zero. Nonetheless,
the robustness results suffer from a possible selection issue—data on the lead plaintiff and lead counsel exist only
for cases that survive to the lead plaintiff selection stage of litigation.
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plaintiffs on what they need to do to craft an adequate complaint. Judges may vary in their
willingness to afford plaintiffs that opportunity, and they have fairly substantial discretion in
dismissing with or without prejudice, at least after the first dismissal, which will typically be
without prejudice.
Tellabs may have sent an important signal to judges with respect to how lenient they
should be in affording plaintiffs an opportunity to plead. And for courts that previously
adhered to the Preponderance standard, Tellabs announced a more lenient standard that might
well require a re‐evaluation of the complaint if it had not already been dismissed with
prejudice. For courts adhering to the reasonableness standard, Tellabs invites a new inquiry
applying its more exacting standard. To test these propositions, we limit our sample to those
cases that ended up with a dismissal with prejudice. We use the number of dismissal decisions
before a court reaches the final dismissal with prejudice as a proxy for the length of the
dismissal decision. For those cases that resulted in a dismissal with prejudice, the number of
dismissal decisions ranged from 1 to 4 in our data set. We use an ordered logit model, with the
number of decisions required to get to a dismissal with prejudice as our dependent variable.
We estimate three models with the same independent variables (including Case Controls and
Motive Variables) as in the Scienter models in Table 5.

19
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Dismissal Decisions = α + ß1iPost‐Tellabsi + ß2iReasonablenessi
+ ß3iReasonableness * Post‐Tellabsi + ß4iPreponderancei
+ ß5i Preponderance * Post‐Tellabsi + ∑ßkiCase Controlski
+ ∑ßliMotive Variablesli + εi

We present our results in Table 6.

The most interesting results are from the

regressions examining the Ninth Circuit. The coefficient on Post‐Tellabs in the Ninth Circuit‐
only subset regression (Model 2) is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating that it
took significantly more dismissal motion decisions to reach the final dismissal with prejudice
after Tellabs. In Model 3 (with all the circuits), the coefficient on Ninth Circuit is positive and
significant at the 1% level. The coefficient on Ninth Circuit x Post‐Tellabs is positive and
significant at the 5% level. The Ninth Circuit – which appears to be the most willing to grant
dismissal even prior to Tellabs – takes considerably longer to do it after the Tellabs decision. 36
The results from Table 6 indicate that the Ninth Circuit’s greater willingness to dismiss
was apparently tempered, to some extent, by providing plaintiffs with every opportunity to
meet the pleading standard. That tendency was only accentuated by Tellabs, with the Post‐
Tellabs coefficient strongly significant in the regression for the Ninth Circuit subsample and the
interaction variable significant in the overall sample.

[Insert Table 6 about here]
We have found that Tellabs reduced the likelihood of dismissal on scienter grounds in
the Ninth Circuit, while at the same time requiring defendants to go through more rounds of

36

As a robustness test, we added the Top Attorney and All Institutional Lead Plaintiff variables to assess the
importance of attorney and lead plaintiff expertise (and selection) to the three models in Table 6. Unreported, the
robustness models generate the same qualitative results as in Table 6.
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motions to dismiss in order to obtain a final dismissal with prejudice.

Both of these

consequences mean greater litigation costs for defendants, suggesting that defendants should
be more willing to pay a settlement in order to rid themselves of even a weak case. Thus,
another measure of the overall effect of Tellabs on litigation outcomes is the incidence of
nuisance settlement.
In Table 7, we focus on the sub‐sample of class actions that resulted in a settlement.
We use as our dependent variable “Nuisance,” which equals 1 if the settlement amount was for
$3 million or less and 0 if the settlement amount was for greater than $3 million. Did Tellabs
increase the incidence of nuisance settlement? We estimate logit regressions with Nuisance as
the dependent variable. We estimate three models with the same the same independent
variables (including Case Controls) as in the Terminate models in Table 4.

Nuisance = α + ß1iPost‐Tellabsi + ß2iReasonablenessi
+ ß3iReasonableness * Post‐Tellabsi + ß4iPreponderancei
+ ß5i Preponderance * Post‐Tellabsi + ∑ßkiCase Controlski + εi

For the overall sample, we find that the Reasonableness standard correlated positively
with nuisance settlements; Tellabs appears to have bolstered defendants in these circuits in
refusing to pay nuisance settlements. In Model 1, the coefficient on Reasonableness is positive
and significant at the 1% level; the coefficient on Reasonableness x Post‐Tellabs is negative
significant at the 5% level.

At the other end of the spectrum, the coefficient for the

Preponderance standard is insignificant, as is the interaction variable with Post‐Tellabs,
suggesting that Tellabs had little effect on nuisance settlement in those circuits. When we
21
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isolate the Ninth Circuit in Model 2, we see no effect of Tellabs within the circuit standing
alone. The coefficient on Post‐Tellabs is not significantly different from zero. In Model 3, we
observe that the coefficient on Ninth Circuit is negative and significant at the 5% level—
indicating that prior to Tellabs, the Ninth Circuit had significantly lower probability of a nuisance
suit outcome relative to the other circuits. In contrast, we find a positive coefficient (significant
at the 5% level) on the interaction variable between the Ninth Circuit and Post‐Tellabs. This
suggests that Tellabs increased the likelihood of nuisance settlement in the Ninth Circuit. With
dismissal less likely in the Ninth Circuit after Tellabs, defendants appear to have become more
willing to settle weak cases for low value settlement amounts. 37

3.5

Tellabs and Dura
One potentially confounding effect on our analysis of the impact of Tellabs on lower

court decisionmaking is another Supreme Court decision affecting motions to dismiss, Dura
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo. 38 Dura had a fairly typical profile for a securities fraud class
action: pharmaceutical company announces declining sales and the FDA’s rejection of a new
product, stock price falls, lawsuit ensues. What was unusual about Dura’s fact pattern was the
sequence of these events. The stock price fall came in response to the announcement of the
decline in sales, while the FDA’s failure to approve the new product came eight months later.
37

As a robustness test, we added the Top Attorney and All Institutional Lead Plaintiff variables to assess the
importance of attorney and lead plaintiff expertise (and selection) to the three models in Table 7. Unreported, the
robustness models generate the same qualitative results as in Table 7.
We also re‐estimate the models in Table 7 with a different cutoff for nuisance suits‐‐treating settlements
for $4 million or less as a nuisance settlement. Unreported, models generated similar results as in Table 7 except
that the coefficient on Reasonableness x Post‐Tellabs in Model 1 is significant at only the 10% level. The coefficient
on Ninth Circuit in Model 3 is only significant at the 14.7% level and the coefficient on Ninth Circuit x Post‐Tellabs is
significant at the 16.6% level, beyond the limits of conventional significance.
38
544 U.S. 336 (2005).
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This latter announcement was met by a drop in the stock price, but the price quickly
rebounded. Given the rebound in the stock price shortly after the FDA announcement, the
PSLRA’s damages cap would likely have precluded the recovery of any damages if they were
measured from by the reaction to that announcement. 39 Thus, framing the class period to end
with the announcement of the sales decline provided the maximum available value line, even
though it meant a somewhat shorter class period to apply that value line to. Moreover, the
FDA rejection gave the plaintiffs’ lawyers another set of misstatements with which to satisfy the
requisite Rule 10b‐5 elements, in particular scienter and materiality.
In most circuits, the Dura plaintiffs’ lawyers’ stratagem would have been easily rebuffed
by the court, as the majority view required some connection between the alleged misstatement
and the economic loss claimed. 40 The district court in Dura agreed, dismissing the allegation
relating to the FDA rejection for failure to plead loss causation. Importantly, the district court
also rejected the allegations relating to the sales decline for failure to adequately plead
scienter. The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed the dismissal of the FDA allegations, holding that
the plaintiff’s loss only need “touch” the misstatement (Touch Causation), and that this
requirement could be satisfied by alleging that the price was inflated by the misrepresentation
at the time of purchase. 41
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous, opinion, rejected the Ninth Circuit’s touch
causation standard as inconsistent with the PSLRA’s requirement that the plaintiff show that
39

Exchange Act § 21D(e), 15 U.S.C. 78u‐4(e).
Emergent Capital Inv. Management, LLC v. Stonepath Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 189 (2nd Cir. 2003); Semerenko v.
Cendant Corp., 223 F.3d 165 (3rd Cir. 2000); Miller v. Asensio & Co., Inc., 364 F.3d 223 (4th Cir. 2004); Nathensen v.
Zonagen, Inc., 267 F.3d 400 (5th Cir. 2001); Caremark, Inc. v. Coram Healthcare Corp., 113 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1997);
Robbins v. Koger Properties, Inc., 116 F.3d 1441 (11th Cir. 1997).
41
Broudo v. Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 339 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2003).
40
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the misstatement “caused” the loss. 42 The Court went on to hold that plaintiffs must also plead
some basis for loss causation in their complaint, without specifying exactly what that might
entail. Given the general consensus on the issue of loss causation prior to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Dura, the Ninth Circuit’s position was something of an outlier, shared only by the
Eighth Circuit. 43 Thus, we predict the decision had little effect on practice in securities class
actions.
Unfortunately, our sample is not designed to test the influence of Dura on dismissal
decisions. We have very few loss causation decisions in the Ninth Circuit prior to the Supreme
Court’s Dura decision, perhaps because the “touch causation” standard made filing a motion to
dismiss on such grounds futile. So instead of looking at motion to dismiss decisions, we collect
the number of words that plaintiffs’ attorneys include in their complaints addressing loss
causation and use it as dependent variable in an ordinary least squares regression.

For the

independent variables, we include an indicator variable for decisions Post‐Dura, another, Touch
Causation, for cases in those circuits which did not require proof of loss causation prior to Dura
(the Eighth and Ninth Circuits), and an interaction variable between those two to capture the
effect of the change in the law in those circuits represented by Dura. In addition, we include
the Case Control variables.

Loss Causation Wordsi = α + ß1iPost Durai + ß2iTouch Causationi
+ ß3iTouch Causation*Post‐Durai + ∑ßkiCase Controlski + εi

42

Exchange Act § 21D(b)(4); 15 U.S.C. 78u‐4(b)(4) (plaintiff must show that “the [challenged] act or omission of the
defendant *** caused the loss for which the plaintiff seeks to recover damages.”).
43
In re Control Data Corp. Sec. Litig., 933 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1991).
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Table 8 presents the results. In Model 1, note that the coefficient on Touch Causation is
negative and significant at the 5% level; however, the coefficient on Touch Causation x Post‐
Dura is positive and significant at the 5% level.

While Touch Causation jurisdiction had

significantly shorter loss causation sections prior to Dura (as predicted because those
jurisdictions did not require proof of loss causation), post‐Dura plaintiffs increased the length of
their loss causation sections in Touch Causation circuits up to approximately the same length as
in the non‐Touch Causation jurisdictions. This increase occurred particularly in the Ninth
Circuit. The coefficient on Post‐Dura in Model 2 (Ninth Circuit only) is positive and significant at
the 5% level. In Model 3, the coefficient on Ninth Circuit is negative and significant at the 5%
level while the Ninth Circuit x Post‐Dura interaction term is positive and significant at the 5%
level. Thus, we conclude that Dura’s primary impact was on pleading practices in the Ninth
Circuit. 44
[Insert Table 8 About Here].

4.

Conclusion
This study examines the impact of the Supreme Court’s first decision interpreting the

“strong inference” pleading standard of the PSLRA. In Tellabs, the Supreme Court rejected the
Seventh Circuit’s “reasonableness” standard for drawing inferences of fraudulent intent from a

44

As a robustness test, we substitute the log of words as the dependent variable in the models in Table 8. Not
reported, the robustness models provided similar results. The coefficient on Post‐Dura is positive and significant at
the 1% level in all three models, indicating an increase in the length of the loss causation section for all circuits
post‐Dura. In Model 3, the coefficient on Ninth Circuit is negative and significant at the 5% level while the Ninth
Circuit x Post‐Dura interaction term is positive and significant at the 5% level. Unlike the models in Table 8,
however, the coefficient on Touch Causation and Touch Causation x Post‐Dura are not significantly different from
zero—indicating that in the robustness regressions the effect of Dura on the loss causation section length is
greatest primarily for the Ninth Circuit.
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complaint. The Seventh Circuit standard was consistent with longstanding practice in the
federal courts, but difficult to square with the language adopted by Congress in the PSLRA.
Consequently, the reasonableness standard was a distinct outlier among the circuit courts, and
the Supreme Court’s reversal of it had little impact.
Substantially more important was the Tellabs Court’s rejection of the “preponderance”
standard followed in the First, Fourth, Sixth and Ninth Circuits. We find that circuits that
employed a preponderance standard prior to Tellabs, particularly the Ninth Circuit, are less
likely to dismiss on scienter grounds after that decision. We also find that Tellabs correlates
with an overall lower likelihood of dismissal in the Ninth Circuit. The result of this reduction in
the standards for pleading fraud in the Ninth Circuit means that defendants are more willing to
pay a nuisance settlement post‐Tellabs. These findings suggest that Tellabs may have been, on
balance, a victory for the plaintiffs’ bar, despite its reversal of a pro‐plaintiff decision in the
lower court.
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Table 1: Sample Description
Panel A
Year of Suit Filing

Freq.

Percent

2003

147

26.16

2004

174

30.96

2005

140

24.91

2006

87

15.48

2007

14

2.49

Total

562

100

Circuit Court
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Total

Freq.
37
102
48
21
50
25
26
26
149
23
52
3
562

Percent
6.58
18.15
8.54
3.74
8.9
4.45
4.63
4.63
26.51
4.09
9.25
0.53
100

Panel B
9th Cir.

All

Other

Suit Outcome (If Known)

Freq.

Percent

Freq.

Percent

Freq.

Percent

Settlement

185

47.44

45

41.67

140

49.65

Trial Verdict for Plaintiff

1

0.26

1

0.93

0

0.00

Summary Judgment for Defendant

4

1.03

1

0.93

3

1.06

Voluntary Dismissal

45

11.54

17

15.74

28

9.93

Dismissal with Prejudice

155

39.74

44

40.74

111

39.36

Total

390

100

108

100.00

282

100.00

th

Chi2 test of the difference between the 9 Cir and Other = 5.9969 (pr = 0.199)
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Independent Variables
9th Cir.

All

Variable

Mean

Section 11

Mean

0.110

Stand.
Dev.
0.313

Section 14

0.029

Govt. Investigation

Other

Mean

0.075

Stand.
Dev.
0.265

0.167

0.043

0.269

0.444

Restatement

0.364

Officer Term.

Tests of
Differences
p‐value

0.126

Stand.
Dev.
0.332

0.203

0.022

0.147

0.151

0.228

0.420

0.288

0.453

0.120

0.482

0.370

0.484

0.361

0.481

0.835

0.322

0.468

0.296

0.458

0.334

0.472

0.357

Auditor Term.

0.069

0.253

0.082

0.276

0.063

0.243

0.384

Market Capitalization

6.386

2.178

6.420

1.968

6.374

2.252

0.827

High Tech

0.156

0.363

0.201

0.402

0.136

0.343

0.040

FDA

0.037

0.190

0.022

0.147

0.044

0.206

0.189

Confidential

0.5241

0.500

0.478

0.501

0.545

0.499

0.134

Insider Trading

0.576

0.495

0.586

0.494

0.571

0.496

0.739

Bonus

0.291

0.455

0.249

0.433

0.310

0.463

0.126

Offering

0.283

0.451

0.270

0.445

0.288

0.454

0.655

Acquisition

0.140

0.348

0.119

0.325

0.150

0.358

0.310

Merger

0.081

0.274

0.060

0.237

0.091

0.289

0.189

Top Attorney

0.597

0.491

0.673

0.471

0.571

0.496

0.063

All Institutional Lead Plaintiff

0.383

0.487

0.338

0.475

0.338

0.475

0.211

0.067

p‐value is from two‐sided t‐test of the difference in means. Variable definitions are in the appendix.
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Table 3: Basis for Dismissal
Final Dismissal Decision
Grounds

Dismissal
denied based
on the ground
(=‐1)

Did not rule on the
ground or both
denied and granted
dismissal based on
the ground (=0)

Dismissal
granted (at
least partially)
based on the
ground (=1)

Total

Scienter

91

144

156

391

23.27%

36.83%

39.9%

100%

54

297

40

391

13.81%

75.96%

10.23%

100%

37

305

49

391

9.46%

78.01%

12.53%

100%

17

367

7

391

4.35%

93.86%

1.79%

100%

37

315

39

391

9.46%

80.56%

9.97%

100%

67

226

98

391

17.14%

57.8%

25.06%

100%

12

366

13

391

3.07%

93.61%

3.32%

100%

15

358

18

391

3.84%

91.56%

4.6%

100%

9

361

21

391

2.3%

92.33%

5.37%

100%

Loss Causation
Forward Looking Safe Harbor
Reliance
Materiality
Misstatement
Puffery
Attribution to Defendant
Group Pleading
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Table 4: Suit Outcome
Post‐Tellabs

Model 1: All
‐2.820**
(‐5.68)

Reasonableness

0.462
(1.07)

Reasonableness x Post‐Tellabs

0.780
(0.84)

Preponderance

0.217
(0.75)

Preponderance x Post‐Tellabs

0.703
(1.07)

Terminate
Model 2: 9th Cir.
‐3.755**
(‐4.11)

Model 3: All
‐2.276**
(‐6.82)

Ninth Circuit

0.0312
(0.11)

Ninth Circuit x Post‐Tellabs

‐0.874
(‐1.03)

Section 11

‐0.615
(‐1.45)

Section 14

‐1.094
(‐1.23)

Govt. Investigation

‐0.298
(‐1.00)

0.113
(0.14)

‐0.286
(‐0.97)

Restatement

‐0.592*
(‐2.23)

‐2.620**
(‐3.87)

‐0.595*
(‐2.24)

Officer Term.

‐0.437
(‐1.61)

‐0.247
(‐0.39)

‐0.420
(‐1.55)

Auditor Term.

‐0.016
(‐0.03)

0.009
(0.01)

‐0.071
(‐0.14)

ln(Market Capitalization)

0.238**
(3.86)

0.049
(0.31)

0.235**
(3.91)

High Tech

0.034
(0.11)

1.834*
(2.43)

0.120
(0.37)

FDA

‐0.690
(‐1.13)

‐0.494
(‐0.38)

‐0.688
(‐1.16)

Confidential

‐0.161
(‐0.65)

‐0.241
(‐0.43)

‐0.136
(‐0.56)

Constant

‐0.574
(‐1.33)
414
0.243

0.975
(0.90)
112
0.396

‐0.444
(‐1.08)
414
0.237

N
pseudo R2

‐1.789
(‐1.41)

‐0.601
(‐1.43)
‐0.932
(‐1.03)
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t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Logit model: Dependent variable “Terminate” equals 1
if suit ended in summary judgment for defendant, voluntary dismissal, or dismissal with prejudice; 0 if suit ended
in either settlement or trial verdict for plaintiffs. Variable definitions are in the appendix.
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Table 5: Final Dismissal Decisions Based on Scienter
Post‐Tellabs
Reasonableness

Model 1: All
‐0.114
(‐0.26)

Scienter
Model 2: 9th Cir.
‐1.965*
(‐2.56)

Model 3: All
‐0.0440
(‐0.13)

0.0783
(0.18)

\

Reasonableness x Post‐Tellabs

1.398
(1.35)

Preponderance

0.878*
(2.48)

Preponderance x Post‐Tellabs

‐1.168+
(‐1.86)

Ninth Circuit

1.343**
(3.27)

Ninth Circuit x Post‐Tellabs

‐1.735*
(‐2.57)

Insider Trading

0.134
(0.48)

0.258
(0.35)

0.159
(0.57)

Bonus

0.025
(0.08)

0.088
(0.11)

0.073
(0.24)

Offering

‐0.273
(‐0.87)

‐0.433
(‐0.55)

‐0.199
(‐0.65)

Acquisition

‐0.102
(‐0.31)

‐0.893
(‐1.07)

‐0.038
(‐0.11)

Merger

‐0.0888
(‐0.18)

2.444+
(1.77)

‐0.074
(‐0.16)

Constant 1

0.035
(0.07)

‐4.694**
(‐3.01)

‐0.023
(‐0.05)

Constant 1

0.574
(1.12)

‐3.615*
(‐2.41)

0.518
(1.04)

Case Controls
N
pseudo R2

Yes
251
0.069

Yes
70
0.258

Yes
251
0.073

t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Ordered Logit Model: Dependent variable “Scienter” is
defined to equal 1 if the final motion to dismiss decision ordered dismissal (at least partially) based on a failure to
plead scienter with particularity, 0 if the decision either did not rule on dismissal based on scienter or both denied
and granted dismissal based on scienter, and ‐1 if the decision denied dismissal based on scienter. Case Controls
include Section 11, Section 14, Govt. Investigation, Restatement, Officer Term., Auditor Term., ln(Market
Capitalization), High Tech, FDA, Confidential, and Top Atty. Variable definitions are in the Appendix.
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Table 6: Number of Dismissal Decisions Before Final Dismissal
Post‐Tellabs

Model 1: Alll
0.799
(0.50)

Reasonableness

2.207*
(2.29)

Reasonableness x Post‐Tellabs

‐0.791
(‐0.36)

Preponderance

1.966*
(2.29)

Preponderance x Post‐Tellabs

1.058
(0.57)

Number of Dismissal Decisions
Model 2: 9th Cir.
Model 3: All
6.556**
0.339
(2.80)
(0.30)

Ninth Circuit

2.908**
(3.34)

Ninth Circuit x Post‐Tellabs

4.054*
(2.11)

Constant 1

4.078**
(2.95)

6.507+
(1.83)

4.039**
(2.85)

Constant 2

6.608**
(4.34)

10.60**
(2.60)

7.265**
(4.38)

Constant 3

8.199**
(4.60)

13.74**
(2.80)

9.862**
(4.24)

Yes
Yes
134
0.247

Yes
Yes
40
0.518

Yes
Yes
134
0.363

Case Controls
Motive Variables
N
pseudo R2

t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Ordered Logit Model: Dependent variable “Number of
Dismissal Decisions” equals the number of opinions on motions to dismiss for cases that ultimately end with a
dismissal with prejudice. The ordered logit models are estimated solely for class actions that resulted in a dismissal
with prejudice. Case Controls include Section 11, Section 14, FDA, Insider Trading, Govt. Investigation,
Restatement, Officer Term., Auditor Term., High Tech, Bonus, Offering, Acquisition, Merger, and Confidential.
Motive Variables include Insider Trading, Bonus, Offering, Acquisition, and Merger. Variable definitions are in the
Appendix
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Table 7 : Nuisance Suit Outcome

Post‐Tellabs

Nuisance
Model 2
9th Cir.
0.336
(0.32)

Model 1
All
‐0.325
(‐0.60)

Reasonableness

2.500**
(2.81)

Reasonableness x Post‐Tellabs

‐3.526*
(‐2.34)

Preponderance

‐0.238
(‐0.46)

Preponderance x Post‐Tellabs

0.0868
(0.10)

Model 3
All
‐1.082*
(‐2.43)

Ninth Circuit

‐1.174*
(‐2.07)

Ninth Circuit x Post‐Tellabs

1.730+
(1.88)

Constant
Case Controls
N
pseudo R2

‐0.0651
(‐0.09)
Yes
163
0.134

‐3.160
(‐1.44)
Yes
41
0.224

0.282
(0.44)
Yes
165
0.088

t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Logit model: Dependent variable “Nuisance” is equal to
1 if the settlement amount was for $3 million or less and 0 if the settlement amount was for greater than $3
million. Models are estimated solely for class actions that resulted in settlement. Case Controls include Section 11,
Section 14, FDA, Insider Trading, Govt. Investigation, Restatement, Officer Term., Auditor Term., High Tech, Bonus,
Offering, Acquisition, Merger, and Confidential. Motive Variables include Insider Trading, Bonus, Offering,
Acquisition, and Merger. Variable definitions are in the appendix.
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Table 8: Loss Causation Words

Post‐Dura

Model 1
All

Loss Causation Words
Model 2
9th Cir.

Model 3
All

‐166.9
(‐0.48)

1028.5*
(2.17)

‐77.99
(‐0.23)

Touch Causation

‐1102.7*
(‐2.11)

Touch Causation x Post‐Dura

1303.1*
(2.23)

Ninth Circuit

‐1155.1*
(‐2.08)

Ninth Circuit x Post‐Dura

1318.2*
(2.11)

1005.2*
‐326.0
958.4*
(2.04)
(‐0.34)
(1.97)
Case Controls
Yes
Yes
Yes
N
340
90
340
R2
0.080
0.129
0.079
t statistics in parentheses; + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01. Ordinary Least Squares: Dependent variable “Loss
Causation Words” is the number of words used to plead loss causation in the complaint. Case Controls include
Section 11, Section 14, FDA, Insider Trading, Govt. Investigation, Restatement, Officer Term., Auditor Term., High
Tech, Bonus, Offering, Acquisition, Merger, and Confidential. Variable definitions are in the appendix.
Constant
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
Dependent Variables
Variable

Description

Terminate

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the class action ended in a summary judgment for
the defendant, a voluntary dismissal, or a dismissal with prejudice and 0 if the
class action ended in either a settlement or a victory at trial for the plaintiffs.

Scienter

Variable for the final motion to dismiss decision based on scienter pleading
grounds. Defined as equal to 1 if the final motion to dismiss decision ordered
dismissal (at least partially) based on the ground in question, 0 if the decision
either did not rule on dismissal based on the ground in question or both denied
and granted dismissal based on the ground in question, and ‐1 if the decision
denied dismissal based on the ground in question.

Number of Dismissal Decisions

The number of judge opinions on motions to dismiss for cases that ultimately
end with a dismissal with prejudice.

Nuisance

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the settlement amount was for $3 million or less
and 0 if the settlement amount was for greater than $3 million.

Independent Variables
Case Control Variables

Description

Section 11

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint for a particular class action alleged
a Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 violation and 0 otherwise.

Section 14

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint for a particular class action alleged
a Section 14 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 violation and 0 otherwise.

Govt. Investigation

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated the presence of a SEC or
other governmental investigation or enforcement action relating to the fraud at
issue and 0 otherwise.

Restatement

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that the company
announced a restatement covering at least part of the class period and 0
otherwise.

Officer Term.

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that a top officer of the
defendant company resigned or was terminated during the class period and 0
otherwise.

Auditor Term.

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint indicated that the auditor resigned
or was terminated during the class period and 0 otherwise.

High Tech

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is in SIC codes 3570‐3577 or 7370‐7379
and 0 otherwise

FDA

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint for a particular class action is
related to disclosures relating to the Federal Drug Administration and 0
otherwise.
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Confidential

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the first complaint filed after the selection of the
lead plaintiff refers to at least one confidential witness who was an employee of
the issuer and 0 otherwise.

Market Capitalization

Market value of a company’s common equity (in $ millions) at the end of the
fiscal year preceding the beginning of the class period

Top Attorney

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the appointed lead counsel is one of the top
attorney firms (measured by frequency of appointment as lead counsel) in the
Choi (2009) dataset.

All Institutional Lead Plaintiff

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the appointed lead plaintiff consists solely of
institutional lead plaintiffs in the Choi (2009) dataset.

Motive Variables
Insider Trading

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint alleged insider trading and 0
otherwise.

Bonus

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint alleged bonus compensation as a
part of the pleadings relating to scienter and 0 otherwise.

Offering

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint alleged a securities offering as a
part of the pleadings relating to scienter and 0 otherwise.

Acquisition

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint alleged inflated stock price to
further corporate acquisitions as a part of the pleadings relating to scienter and
0 otherwise.

Merger

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the complaint alleged a merger or reorganization
as a part of the pleadings relating to scienter and 0 otherwise.

Legal Variables
Post‐Dura

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the decision was made after the Supreme Court’s
Dura Pharmaceuticals decision and 0 otherwise.

Touch Causation

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the circuit did not require allegations of loss
causation, and 0 otherwise.

Post‐Tellabs

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the decision was made after the Supreme Court’s
Tellabs decision and 0 otherwise.

Reasonableness

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the circuit required a reasonable inference, and 0
otherwise.

Preponderance

Indicator variable equal to 1 if the circuit required a preponderant inference,
and 0 otherwise.
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